
I Continue to Feel So Good About Us: In-Group Identification and the Use of Social Identity–Enhancing Strategies to Reduce Intragroup Dissonance

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The present research examined the relation between in-group identification and the use of social identity–enhancing strategies for dealing with the discomfort associated with inconsistency between personal beliefs and in-group behavior (intragroup dissonance). Consistent with the hypothesis that social identity–enhancing strategies would be more effective at reducing intragroup dissonance for those highly identified with the in-group, Experiment 1 demonstrated that level of group identification moderated the effectiveness of group affirmation for reducing psychological discomfort associated with intragroup dissonance, but not the effectiveness of self-affirmation. In Experiment 2, which manipulated level of group identification, participants in a high-identification condition, relative to those in a low-identification condition, were more likely to choose to reduce intragroup dissonance with a strategy that enhanced social identity (i.e., out-group derogation) over a strategy less effective at social identity enhancement (i.e., activism to change the behavior of the group). Implications for intergroup relations are discussed.

Keywords: *social identity; cognitive dissonance; intragroup; in-group identification; affirmation*

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) proposes that individuals derive their self-concept from their perceptions of the “I” (i.e., personal identity) and

their membership in social groups (i.e., social identity). In any given situation, one or both of these identities, personal and social, may be salient and activated. Social identity research has primarily focused on intergroup relations (see Brown, 2000), but the theory also has significant implications for intragroup processes (Postmes & Jetten, 2006). The present research draws on social identity theory to examine the relation between level of in-group identification and strategies for dealing with one such intragroup process, intragroup dissonance (Glasford, Pratto, & Dovidio, 2008).

Because both personal and social identities are important to self-definition, it is not surprising that intragroup processes can arouse cognitive dissonance. The conditions that arouse group-based dissonance are hypothesized to be similar to those that produce individual-level dissonance, namely, an inconsistency among beliefs and behaviors, with the exception that the source of the dissonance resides within the group rather than within the individual. For example, individuals experience

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PSPB, Vol. XX No. X, Month XXXX xx-xx
DOI: 10.1177/0146167208329216

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dissonance when they become aware that other in-group members hold opposing opinions to their own (Matz & Wood, 2005), observe other in-group members behave in an inconsistent way (i.e., vicarious dissonance; Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003), and recognize inconsistency between their personal beliefs or values and the actions of an in-group (i.e., intragroup dissonance; Glasford et al., 2008). Research on intragroup dissonance, in particular, has demonstrated that when the actions of an in-group violate one's personal beliefs, an individual experiences cognitive dissonance, which motivates attempts to reduce the discomfort associated with the dissonance (Glasford et al., 2008). However, it is still unclear what factors help determine the effectiveness or choice of strategies that a group member uses to resolve intragroup dissonance.

Intragroup dissonance is a group-based process, and as a result, it is likely that social identity processes may be influential in dissonance reduction. Individuals derive part of their self-concept from membership in social groups and are therefore motivated to create and maintain positive distinctiveness of the in-group relative to out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This motivation is greater among people more highly identified with the group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). As a consequence, high identifiers are (a) less likely to leave the group in response to negative events (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997), (b) more likely to show in-group bias in response to threatening information about the in-group (Branscombe & Wann, 1994), and (c) more likely to engage in behaviors that position the in-group in a positive light (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002).

Because in-group identification is a fundamental factor in social identity processes, it would be expected to play a significant role in the effectiveness and preference for strategies dealing with dissonance that stems from group actions. However, little is known about how group identification affects the strategies group members use to deal with dissonance that stems from group actions (cf. Norton et al., 2003). Indeed, although individuals are motivated to engage in a strategy that resolves intragroup dissonance discomfort, how group identification plays a role in this dissonance reduction has yet to be examined. The present research investigated the role of group identification in determining the effectiveness and choice of strategies for dealing with the discomfort that arises from in-group violation of personal beliefs. In particular, the present work tested whether high identifiers, relative to low identifiers, are better able to reduce intragroup dissonance discomfort with social identity-enhancing strategies (Experiment 1) and are more likely to choose strategies that enhance social identity (over strategies less effective at social identity enhancement) to reduce this discomfort (Experiment 2).

EXPERIMENT 1

Merely affirming valued aspects of the self can reduce dissonance by reinstating a sense of integrity (Steele & Liu, 1983; see also Matz & Wood, 2005), despite the fact that the dissonance-arousing inconsistency is unresolved. Experiment 1 examined whether group affirmation can reduce dissonance and investigated whether group identification would uniquely moderate the effectiveness of an intragroup dissonance reduction strategy that enhances social identity (group affirmation), but not the effectiveness of a strategy that enhances personal identity (self-affirmation).

The social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell 1987) suggests that behaviors such as group affirmation, which reestablish positive distinctiveness, should be effective for buffering against intragroup dissonance. Several findings point to this possibility. First, when group members are given an opportunity to express valued dimensions of the in-group (group affirmation), they are more willing to approach threatening intergroup contexts (Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2006). Second, people often cope with group failure by emphasizing the greater importance of positive traits of their own group (Lalonde, 1992). Third, group affirmation can serve as a resource to help alleviate the negative effects of threatening group information (e.g., one's sports team has failed; Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, & Prenovost, 2007).

Because of the primacy of group membership in their self-definition, those most connected to the group, relative to those less connected to the group, are often more motivated to use collective coping strategies in response to threat (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002) and experience a greater number of benefits from group affirmation, relative to self-affirmation (Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2007). Moreover, high identifiers are more concerned with group goals than personal goals, often sacrificing opportunities for personal advancement (Ellemers et al., 1997; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). Thus, for people more highly identified with their group, affirming valued aspects of the group would be expected to be an especially effective means for reducing intragroup dissonance. Because self-affirmation relates to personal identity, level of in-group identification was not expected to influence its effectiveness for reducing dissonance. Overall, though, both group affirmation and self-affirmation were hypothesized to alleviate intragroup dissonance compared with a no-affirmation control condition.

Experiment 1 employed the procedure for producing intragroup dissonance used by Glasford et al. (2008). Participants indicated the extent to which they identified with the in-group (the United States), reported the degree to which they endorsed a particular belief, and

then received information that the in-group violated that personal belief (preserving civilian life in war, or the principle of noncombatant immunity). Next, participants were given an opportunity to affirm valued aspects of the self (self-affirmation condition), an opportunity to affirm valued aspects of the in-group (group affirmation condition), or no opportunity to affirm (no-affirmation control condition). All participants then reported their affect, in terms of psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994), as well as two other potentially relevant negative emotions: negative self-directed emotion (Devine & Monteith, 1993) and collective guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, & Manstead, 1998).

We expected both self-affirmation and group affirmation to reduce the psychological discomfort associated with intragroup dissonance, relative to the no-affirmation control condition; however, our primary prediction involved the potential moderating role of in-group identification. Specifically, given the stronger motivation to maintain a positive social identity among high in-group identifiers, we expected that the social identity-enhancing strategy of group affirmation would be particularly effective for reducing dissonance among those more highly identified with the in-group. Because self-affirmation enhances personal identity, however, we did not expect in-group identification to moderate its effects on dissonance reduction.

Method

Participants. Ninety-six undergraduate students (50 women and 46 men) who were U.S. citizens participated to fulfill one option of an introductory psychology course requirement.

Procedure and materials. The procedure and materials were modeled after those used by Glasford et al. (2008). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (self-affirmation, group affirmation, or no affirmation) and completed questionnaires in a group setting. Participants first reported their identification with the United States by rating their agreement (from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*) with three items (see Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003): "I am proud to be an American," "Being an American is an important part of my identity," and "I feel very close to other Americans" ($\alpha = .79$).

Next, participants were asked to read a definition of the principle of noncombatant immunity, paraphrased from the 1949 Geneva Convention. The paragraph indicated that

parties in conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly

shall direct their operations only against military objectives. In other words, the principle states that armed forces should avoid harming or killing civilians at all costs.

Participants then indicated the extent to which they endorsed noncombatant immunity on a scale ranging from 1 (*do not support the principle*) to 7 (*strongly support the principle*) and were asked to write a short essay explaining the aspects of the principle they support. This task was included to make the personal value salient to participants (see Stone & Cooper, 2001). The results indicated that there was a high level of personal support for the principle ($M = 5.52$, $SD = 1.44$, median = 6.00), which did not differ by condition ($F < 1.15$).

To induce intragroup dissonance, participants next read a one-page report describing examples of in-group behavior that violated the principle of noncombatant immunity. The report described examples of U.S. violations of the principle and included the following passages:

Reports confirm that U.S. forces bombed a soda-pop bottling plant, electrical and sanitation facilities, and even an air-raid shelter in which 200-300 civilians sought protection. . . . The Associated Press reports that in air raid strikes last year Baghdad hospitals were hit resulting in over 1,500 Iraqi civilian deaths. . . . There is direct evidence that between 5,000-10,000 Iraqi civilians have died as a result of the war in Iraq.

This paradigm is identical to past research exploring intragroup dissonance (Glasford et al., 2008).

At this point, participants in the self-affirmation and group affirmation conditions were given an opportunity to complete an affirmation task. On the basis of previous work on self-affirmation (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000), participants in the self-affirmation condition were given a short list of several values, such as "business/economics," "artistic skills," "musical ability," and "relationships with friends and family," and were asked to rank-order the values and then write a short essay explaining why the highest ranked value was important to the participant, personally. The group affirmation condition employed a modified version of the self-affirmation procedure, which was used by Sherman et al. (2007). Specifically, participants in the group affirmation condition were given a list of several values that are central to the group's image. As the present study used the United States, the values used were adopted to this group and included "freedom of speech," "melting pot nature of America," "the ability to work hard and succeed in America," "freedom of religion," "the democratic principles of America," "America's environmental heritage," "athletic achievements," "personal freedom," "creativity in entertainment," "America's economic

system,” and “the optimism of Americans.” After ranking the values, participants wrote a short essay explaining why the highest ranked value was most important to America and made them proud to be Americans.¹

All participants then indicated their affective response at present on a scale ranging from 1 (*does not apply at all*) to 7 (*applies very much*). Participants were given a list of adjectives and asked to indicate how they were feeling “right now” in “the moment.” The items were averaged to measure the experience of dissonance-related psychological discomfort and negative self-directed emotion. On the basis of the work of Elliot and Devine (1994), and using the same response format, the dissonance-related discomfort items were “uncomfortable,” “uneasy,” and “bothered” ($\alpha = .86$), and the negative self-directed emotion items were “angry with myself,” “dissatisfied with myself,” “disgusted with myself,” and “annoyed with myself” ($\alpha = .87$). These items were interspersed with filler items in the adjective list. We then measured collective guilt using a modified four-item scale (e.g., “I feel regret for my nation’s harmful past actions toward Iraqi civilians”; Doosje et al., 1998; $\alpha = .85$). Consistent with past research, we expected intragroup dissonance to uniquely produce discomfort (Glasford et al., 2008), but not the other emotions.

Results

Preliminary analyses testing for the effects of participant sex revealed no significant effects in Experiment 1 (or Experiment 2). Thus, this variable was excluded from all subsequent analyses for both studies. Our initial analysis tested the basic prediction that both self-affirmation and group affirmation, overall, would reduce dissonance-related discomfort relative to the no-affirmation control group. For our primary hypotheses, which involved the differential moderating role of in-group identification, the continuous independent variable, on the affirmation conditions (dummy coded; group affirmation = 0, self-affirmation = 1), we used multiple regression (Aiken & West, 1991).

Emotional responses across no-affirmation, self-affirmation, and group affirmation conditions. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing differences in levels of dissonance-related discomfort among the three conditions (self-, group, and no affirmation) revealed a main effect of condition, $F(2, 94) = 17.33, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$. As expected, Tukey’s honestly significantly different (HSD) pairwise procedure revealed that overall, there was no significant difference between the self-affirmation and group affirmation conditions and that participants reported significantly (p values $< .05$) less psychological

discomfort in the group affirmation ($M = 2.29, SD = 1.19$) and self-affirmation ($M = 2.87, SD = 1.60$) conditions compared with the no-affirmation condition ($M = 4.11, SD = 1.27$). As expected, there were no significant effects for affirmation condition on negative self-directed emotion, $F(2, 94) = 1.27, p = .28$, and collective guilt, $F(2, 94) < 1$.

Group identification and reduction of dissonance-related discomfort by self-affirmation versus group affirmation. To assess our primary hypotheses, regarding the relative efficacy of the two affirmation conditions for reducing discomfort among those differing in identification, psychological discomfort was regressed on a self-affirmation/group affirmation contrast, identification with the United States, and their interaction. There was no effect for self-affirmation/group affirmation ($\beta = .13, ns$). However, there was a main effect of in-group identification, $\beta = -.68, t(91) = -5.08, p < .001$, indicating that across conditions, those who had greater in-group identification experienced less psychological discomfort. Of particular relevance to our hypothesis, the analysis also demonstrated the predicted two-way interaction between self-affirmation/group affirmation and in-group identification, $\beta = .27, t(91) = 2.48, p < .015$. As expected (see Figure 1), whereas greater in-group identification predicted less psychological discomfort for the social identity-enhancing strategy of group affirmation, $\beta = -.68, t(91) = -4.85, p < .001$, there was not a significant relation between in-group identification and psychological discomfort for the personal identity-enhancing strategy of self-affirmation ($\beta = -.20, p < .18$).

To illustrate the effect of each type of affirmation for people low or high on group identification, we performed analyses examining psychological discomfort at one standard deviation below and above the mean on group identification and examined the unstandardized weights (see Aiken & West, 1991, p. 132). For “low identifiers” (one standard deviation below the mean), there was no difference between the self-affirmation and group affirmation conditions in the predicted values for psychological discomfort ($b = -.15, t = -.38, p = .70$). However, for “high identifiers” (one standard deviation above the mean), the predicted value for psychological discomfort in the group affirmation condition was significantly lower than the predicted value in the self-affirmation condition ($b = 1.35, t = 3.16, p < .01$).

Supplementary Analyses: Self-Affirmation and Group Affirmation Versus No Affirmation

Although our theoretical focus was on the hypothesized differential moderating effect of identification on




Figure 1 Experiment 1: psychological discomfort as a function of affirmation condition by level of in-group identification. NOTE: Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (*does not apply*) to 7 (*applies very much*).

the social identity-enhancing strategy (group affirmation) relative to the personal identity-enhancing strategy (self-affirmation), we conducted supplementary analyses separately for the effects of each of these conditions relative to the no-affirmation control condition. We created two dummy variables: one comparing the group affirmation condition (coded 1) with the no-affirmation control group (coded 0) and one comparing the self-affirmation condition (coded 1) with the no-affirmation condition (coded 0) (Aiken & West, 1991).

Group affirmation versus no affirmation. The analysis for the group affirmation condition relative to the no-affirmation condition revealed that participants in the group affirmation condition reported less psychological discomfort ($M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.20$) than those in the no-affirmation condition ($M = 4.11$, $SD = 1.27$), $\beta = -.52$, $t(86) = -6.08$, $p < .001$. There was also a significant two-way interaction between the group affirmation/no affirmation contrast and identification with the group, $\beta = -.28$, $t(91) = 2.77$, $p < .01$. In contrast to group affirmation results, which found a strong association between in-group identification experienced psychological discomfort, reported earlier, there was no association between identification and psychological discomfort in the no-affirmation condition ($\beta = .03$, $p = .27$; see Figure 1).

Self-affirmation versus no affirmation. As indicated by the post hoc tests from the ANOVA reported earlier, participants in the self-affirmation condition reported

less psychological discomfort ($M = 2.87$, $SD = 1.60$) than those in the no-affirmation condition ($M = 4.11$, $SD = 1.27$), $\beta = -.30$, $t(91) = -3.56$, $p < .001$. The two-way interaction between self-affirmation/no affirmation contrast and identification with the in-group was not significant ($\beta = .02$, $p = .81$).

Discussion

Experiment 1 demonstrated that although participants in both the self-affirmation and group affirmation conditions had lower levels of dissonance-related discomfort compared with those in the no-affirmation control condition, the group affirmation condition, which enhances social identity, was more effective at reducing dissonance among those with stronger in-group identification. Experiment 1 thus provides initial evidence of the moderating role of group identification in the process of intragroup dissonance reduction.

The results of Experiment 1 may also expand the scope and utility of understanding the usefulness of affirmation for dealing with threats. When individuals experience cognitive dissonance or other threats, there is evidence that a variety of mechanisms, such as self-affirmation (Steele & Liu, 1983) or social comparison (Tesser, 1988), may be substitutable for one another (Tesser, 2001). In Experiment 1, the overall greater effectiveness of group affirmation compared with self-affirmation for those highly identified with the in-group suggests that identity factors, such as identification, can moderate the effectiveness particular strategies, which may affect the potential substitutability of strategies, such that not all strategies are equally effective. The present results also complement work that demonstrates that under certain conditions, affirmation enables people to become more open to threatening information and compromise (Cohen et al., 2007; see also Harvey & Oswald, 2000). After group affirmation, those most connected to the group felt less discomfort about their group's actions, perhaps opening the door to enabling them to become more receptive to accepting additional difficult information about the behavior of the group.

Despite confirmation of our hypotheses, there were shortcomings of Experiment 1 regarding the utility of affirmation for intragroup dissonance. Whereas the results of Experiment 1 revealed that self-affirmation and group affirmation are both viable, and overall comparable, ways to reduce intragroup dissonance, relative to having no opportunity to affirm, future work can improve on our control condition. The interval between the presentation of the dissonance-arousing information (the United States had violated personal beliefs) and the measurement of psychological discomfort in the control condition was somewhat shorter than

the interval in the two affirmation conditions. That is, we did not include an equivalent task that lasted the same amount of time as the affirmation procedures. The longer interval in the affirmation conditions may have contributed to the significantly lower levels of discomfort reported in the affirmation conditions. There is evidence, however, that group affirmation and self-affirmation alleviate other group-related threats (e.g., group failure) compared with a control condition (Sherman et al., 2007). Moreover, this issue is not directly relevant to our primary finding that in-group identification was related to lower levels of dissonance discomfort only in the social identity–enhancing group affirmation condition, but not in the self-affirmation and no-affirmation conditions. Nevertheless, to address potential influences of investment, time, and distraction, future research might consider incorporating a different type of no-affirmation control condition.

Finally, although there was a strong relation between group identification and the social identity–enhancing strategy of group affirmation, we did not find a relation between identification and the amount of discomfort experienced in the no-affirmation condition. One might expect that those more highly identified with their group would experience greater discomfort when the group violated the personally endorsed belief. One reason for this lack of relation may be that the identification measure used in Experiment 1 simultaneously tapped two modes of identification, attachment (e.g., “Being an American is an important part of my identity”) and glorification (e.g., “I am proud to be an American”). These two components of identification have been shown to have contrasting effects on responses to negative in-group behavior (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Indeed, whereas attachment is positively related to collective guilt, glorification has been shown to be negatively related to collective guilt (Roccas et al., 2006). In Experiment 2, we therefore focused solely on the attachment form of identification in our measurement. Using a manipulation of level of identification, in the form of group attachment, Experiment 2 was designed to build on Experiment 1 by examining how in-group identification affects the choice of strategy that group members use to resolve intragroup dissonance.

EXPERIMENT 2

In our initial exploration of the relation between level of in-group identification and social identity strategies for reducing dissonance, participants in the experimental conditions were given only one strategy for relieving dissonance: either a strategy that enhanced personal identity (self-affirmation) or one that enhanced

social identity (group affirmation). Because social identity–enhancing strategies are more effective for high identifiers, it may also be the case that high identifiers are more likely to be drawn to strategies that enhance social identity, over strategies that are less effective at enhancing social identity. Experiment 2 examined preference for strategies and extends Experiment 1 by using a manipulation of in-group identification, which focused solely on the attachment dimension of group identification (Roccas et al., 2006), rather than a general individual difference measure. More specifically, providing stronger evidence of the causal link between in-group identification and social identity–enhancing strategies, Experiment 2 investigated the extent to which a manipulation of level of group identification would affect preference for a strategy that enhances social identity over a strategy less effective at enhancing social identity. We randomly assigned participants to identification condition and gave them two contrasting dissonance reduction strategies: out-group derogation and activism to change the behavior of the in-group.

In one of the few investigations examining preference for dissonance reduction strategies at the individual level, Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, and Aronson (1997) found that when simultaneously given strategies that deal with a dissonant relationship directly (i.e., behavior change) and indirectly (i.e., self-affirmation), participants preferred to use the direct strategy. The results of Experiment 1 revealed that those more strongly identified with the group were better able to reduce intragroup dissonance discomfort with a strategy that enhances social identity compared with one that does not. Building on Experiment 1, Experiment 2 examined whether participants had a preference between two strategies that differed with respect to social identity enhancement and thus theoretically would be expected to vary with level of in-group identification. On the basis of a large body of research demonstrating the variety of functions that out-group derogation serves (e.g., positive distinctiveness; see Rothbart & Lewis, 1994), we examined out-group derogation as one potential dissonance reduction strategy. Because of the direct evidence of the effectiveness of activism as a strategy in our previous work (Glasford et al., 2008), we also explored the opportunity to actively support changing the group’s actions (i.e., activism) as an alternative dissonance reduction strategy. Pretesting indicated that out-group derogation is perceived to be a more effective strategy for enhancing social identity than activism.

Given the goal of maintaining a positive social identity postulated by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we expected participants low and high in group identification to be attracted to the strategies of out-group derogation and activism to differing degrees.

Although level of in-group identification is not necessarily associated with intergroup bias, people more highly identified with their group are particularly likely to engage in out-group derogation when the image of the in-group is threatened (Ellemers et al., 2002) and when intergroup comparisons are salient (Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Indeed, when there is threat associated with a social identity, those most identified with the group typically respond by engaging in strategies, such as out-group derogation (Branscombe & Wann, 1994), that differentiate the in-group from other groups and position the group in a positive light. Given these findings, as well as the results of Experiment 1 demonstrating that social identity-enhancing strategies are more effective than strategies that do not enhance social identity, we expected those highly identified with their in-group to prefer out-group derogation over activism to reduce intragroup dissonance. No such preference was expected for low identifiers.

Within a 2 (level of identification: low vs. high) \times 2 (violation: violation vs. no-violation) design, participants, who were either induced to have a high level of identification with the in-group (high-identification condition) or a low level of identification (low-identification condition), learned that an in-group (the United States) did (violation condition) or did not (no-violation condition) violate a personal belief (providing basic health care to citizens). Thus, Experiment 2 offers the opportunity to test for the causal role of level of group identification on choice of dissonance reduction strategy. Experiment 2 also further investigated the hypothesized unique emotional experience of intragroup dissonance (psychological discomfort) by measuring different affective states (e.g., sadness) than those measured in Experiment 1. Participants were then given a choice between two dissonance reduction strategies: an opportunity to engage in out-group derogation (by choosing a survey of attitudes toward Muslims) that allowed for immediate social identity enhancement or to express support for changing the behavior of the in-group (by selecting a survey about activism to change U.S. actions), which did not provide an opportunity to immediately enhance social identity.

We expected that when the in-group violated a personal belief, participants in the high-identification condition would be more likely than those in the low-identification condition to choose the social identity-enhancing strategy of out-group derogation (in contrast to activism) as a means of reducing intragroup dissonance. We expected similar results for the continuous survey preference measure. In each case, we predicted Violation \times Identification interactions, such that those in the high-identification-violation condition would prefer out-group derogation (attitudes toward Muslims

survey) more than participants in the other conditions as a means of reducing intragroup dissonance.

Method

Participants. One hundred twenty-nine undergraduate students (74 women and 55 men, all Americans) participated to fulfill a partial requirement for their introductory psychology course.

Procedure and materials. Participants, who were randomly assigned to conditions, completed questionnaires in group settings. Participants were informed that they would be completing two surveys for separate studies and that after completing the first survey, they would be able to choose the second survey from two options. The selection of second survey served as the dependent measure for choice of dissonance reduction strategy.

The identification manipulation, which was directed at influencing group attachment (Roccas et al., 2006), was implemented at the beginning of the first part of the study. Once again, the United States was used as the in-group. In the high-identification condition, participants were instructed to write an essay explaining “what makes you similar to most Americans, why you identify as an American, why being American is important to you, and anything else you believe makes you like most Americans.” In the low-identification condition, participants were instructed to write an essay explaining “what makes you dissimilar to most Americans, why you do not identify as an American, why you would say being an American is unimportant to you, and anything else you believe makes you unique compared to most Americans.” In both conditions, participants were asked to write a minimum of five sentences and use the next blank page if necessary. This method is similar to past research that has manipulated in-group identification by having participants think about similarity (Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002).

Participants then reported their level of identification by indicating their agreement (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*) with three items, interspersed with filler items: “I identify with American people,” “Being an American is an important part of my identity,” and “I see myself as American” ($\alpha = .81$).

Intragroup dissonance was then induced using a different belief than that of Experiment 1, valuing basic health care (see Glasford et al., 2008, Experiment 1). Participants were given a description of the principle, indicated their support for the principle, and then received information that the in-group either did or did not violate the principle. Specifically, participants read a definition of the principle of basic health care, paraphrased from the mission statement of the World Health

Organization. The principle states, in part, that “the right to health is considered an inviolable or unchallengeable right. . . . As there is a basic human right to health, everyone should receive equitable access to basic medical treatment necessary for living.” Participants then indicated the extent to which they endorsed providing basic health care on a scale ranging from 1 (*do not support the principle*) to 7 (*strongly support the principle*). In addition, as in Experiment 1, participants were then asked to write a short essay explaining the aspects of the value they support. Results indicated that there was a high level of personal support for the principle ($M = 6.11$, $SD = 1.06$, median = 6.00), which did not differ by condition, $F < 2.70$

At this point, participants read one of two one-page reports that reported that the belief was or was not violated by the in-group. In the violation condition, the report read, in part, “The United States has done little to help those who do not have medical insurance. . . . over 41 million Americans have no health insurance. . . . over 18,000 Americans die each year because of a lack of healthcare services.” The no-violation report stated, in part, “The United States helps those who do not have medical insurance. . . . The United States invests billions of dollars in health care coverage by directly providing insurance. . . . thousands of Americans lives are saved because of Medicare and Medicaid.”

After reading the one-page report, all participants were given psychological discomfort items (“uncomfortable,” “uneasy,” and “bothered”; $\alpha = .82$), along with new items reflecting sadness (“sad,” “gloomy,” and “melancholy”; $\alpha = .86$) and pride (“proud,” “thrilled,” and “satisfied”; $\alpha = .90$).

Opportunity to choose dissonance reduction route. Upon completion of the first survey, participants informed the experimenter that they had completed the survey. The experimenter then gave participants a sheet to make their second survey selection.

Consistent with past research examining choice of dissonance reduction route (Stone et al., 1997), participants were given the choice of two dissonance reduction strategies simultaneously. The instructions read, “You now have an opportunity to *choose* the second survey you will complete today. Below are two brief descriptions of each survey. Please read each, and choose the survey you wish to participate in next.” The two survey descriptions were then presented directly adjacent to each other. The two descriptions were created to give participants two distinct routes to dissonance reduction. The description for the survey titled “Policy Attitudes and Preferences: Changing the Actions of the United States” assessed the extent to which participants’ desired to work to change the behavior of the group.

This survey represented the opportunity to express activism option. The survey description read,

This survey will ask you questions about the degree to which you support actions to change the policies of the U.S. You will also be asked whether others should engage in actions to change U.S. social policies and behaviors that they disagree with. The survey will take about five minutes.

This description was designed to give participants an opportunity to choose behavior change as a dissonance reduction strategy.

The description for the survey titled “Attitudes and Beliefs About Muslims” read,

This survey will ask you about your attitudes and beliefs regarding Muslims. . . . whether you think Muslims are responsible for many of the world’s problems. You will also be asked whether you think the Islamic religion is dangerous. The survey will take about five minutes.

This description was designed to give participants an opportunity to choose out-group derogation as a dissonance reduction strategy. The present experiment used Muslims as the out-group because of research suggesting that Americans are more willing to discriminate against Muslims than against other groups living in the United States (Franco & Maass, 1999). Pilot testing supported our assumption that people perceived the “Changing the Actions of the United States” description to be associated with opportunities for activism and the “Attitudes and Beliefs About Muslims” description to be associated with an opportunity to express out-group derogation. In addition, pilot testing, in which respondents were presented with one of the two survey descriptions, also confirmed that participants perceived that completing the attitudes toward Muslim survey would make them feel better about the in-group (i.e., enhance social identity) more than completing the activism survey.

After the descriptions, choice of second survey (dissonance reduction strategy) was assessed by presenting the titles of both surveys and asking participants’ to mark an X next to the desired survey in the space provided. This X served as a forced-choice measure of preference for dissonance reduction route. To obtain a continuous measure, participants were also asked to indicate on a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*) the extent to which they had a desire to complete each survey.

Participants who chose the “change U.S. policy” survey were then given a new survey assessing the extent to which they wanted to engage in activism to change U.S. policy. The items were adapted from the activism orientation scale (Corning & Myers, 2002). The directions

TABLE 1: Means (standard deviations) as a Function of In-Group Violation and Manipulated In-Group Identification (Experiment 2)

Condition	Discomfort	Sadness	Pride	Survey Choice: Muslim Attitudes vs. U.S. Policy	Survey Preference	
					Muslim Attitudes	Change U.S. Policy
No violation						
High identification	2.69 (1.23)	3.14 (1.50)	3.86 (1.27)	43% to 57%	3.42 (1.85)	4.20 (1.77)
Low identification	3.01 (1.13)	3.06 (1.07)	3.65 (1.41)	50% to 50%	4.21 (2.06)	4.72 (2.09)
Violation						
High identification	4.47 (1.43)	3.21 (1.45)	2.85 (1.30)	65% to 35%	5.34 (1.47)	3.81 (1.87)
Low identification	3.48 (0.94)	3.90 (1.35)	2.68 (1.33)	42% to 58%	4.08 (1.86)	4.88 (1.67)

read, “We would like to get your attitudes and beliefs regarding the likelihood of you working to change U.S. domestic and foreign policies.” The four items described activities aimed at changing the behavior of the United States and included “I would like to change U.S. domestic policies,” “In the future, I intend to obtain more information about U.S. domestic policies,” “In the future, I will send a letter or email to a public official about U.S. domestic and foreign policies,” and “In the future, I plan to keep track of the views of members of Congress.” Participants rated their level of agreement on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly disagree*). The items were averaged to create a composite score of desire to change U.S. policy ($\alpha = .78$).

Participants who chose the “Muslim attitudes” survey were given a questionnaire assessing the extent to which they would derogate Muslims. The directions read, “Some people believe that Muslims and the Islamic religion are to blame for many of the world’s problems. We would like to get your attitudes and beliefs, regarding Muslims.” The four items were adopted from the anti-Black attitudes scale (Katz & Hass, 1988) and were as follows: “Muslims are to blame for many of the world’s problems,” “Most Muslims do not have a lot to offer society,” “The root cause of most of the social and economic ills in Islamic countries is the weakness and instability of Muslim families,” and “Very few Muslims are actually dangerous to society (r).” Participants rated their level of agreement on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly disagree*) scale. The items were averaged to create a composite score of out-group derogation ($\alpha = .68$).

Results

Manipulation check. To determine the efficacy of the in-group identification induction manipulation, a two-way ANOVA was conducted on the measure of identification. This analysis revealed only the anticipated effect of identification condition, $F(1, 125) = 20.31, p < .05, \eta^2 = .14$. Participants in the high-identification condition reported greater identification with the United

States ($M = 5.88, SD = 1.01$) compared with those in the low-identification condition ($M = 4.93, SD = 1.42$).

Affective responses. To examine whether participants’ emotional reactions differed by condition, 2 (level of identification: low vs. high) \times 2 (violation: violation vs. no-violation) univariate ANOVAs were conducted on psychological discomfort, sadness, and pride. The means for each of these measures are presented in Table 1.

The analysis for psychological discomfort revealed a main effect of violation condition, $F(1, 125) = 27.29, p < .01, \eta^2 = .17$. Participants reported more psychological discomfort in the violation condition ($M = 4.01, SD = 1.31$) than in the no-violation condition ($M = 2.84, SD = 1.18$). The effect, however, was qualified by the predicted Identification \times Violation condition interaction, $F(1, 125) = 9.33, p < .01, \eta^2 = .07$. As expected (see Table 1), when the in-group violated the belief, participants in the high-identification condition reported significantly more psychological discomfort than participants in the low-identification condition, $F(1, 125) = 12.74, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$. However, there were no differences between those in the high-identification and those in the low-identification conditions when the group did not violate the belief ($F < 1$). Furthermore, a Tukey HSD procedure for pairwise comparisons revealed that the high-identification–violation condition was marginally significantly different than the other three conditions on psychological discomfort ($p = .05$). Pairwise comparisons revealed no difference between the other three conditions on psychological discomfort.

The ANOVA for sadness demonstrated a marginally significant effect of violation condition, $F(1, 125) = 3.62, p < .06, \eta^2 = .02$; participants felt more sadness in the violation condition ($M = 3.55, SD = 1.44$) than in the no-violation conditions ($M = 3.10, SD = 1.30$). The Violation \times Identification interaction was not significant ($p = .11$). For pride, a main effect for violation was found, $F(1, 125) = 17.36, p < .001, \eta^2 = .12$. Participants reported less pride in the violation conditions ($M = 2.77, SD = 1.31$) compared with the no-violation conditions

($M = 3.76$, $SD = 1.34$). The interaction with identification was not significant ($p = .92$).

Choice and preference for dissonance reduction strategy. A hierarchical log-linear analysis was used to test our hypothesis regarding the relation between group identification and choice of the social identity-enhancing strategy, assessed via the forced-choice selection of surveys (Muslim attitudes or change U.S. policy), which was analyzed as a function of violation and level of identification conditions and revealed a marginally significant three-way association, $\chi^2(1) = 2.78$, $p = .09$. As predicted, after learning the in-group violated the principle of basic health care, participants in the high-identification condition were more likely to choose the identity-enhancing out-group derogation strategy (Muslim attitude survey) over the strategy less effective at identity enhancement (change U.S. policy survey) (65% vs. 35%), compared with those in the low-identification condition (42% vs. 58%), $\chi^2(1, N = 75) = 3.79$, $p < .06$. Also, as expected, there was not a significant association between identification condition and choice of dissonance reduction in the no-violation condition, $\chi^2(1, N = 54) = 0.27$. When the in-group did not violate their personal beliefs, participants in the high-identification condition were not significantly more likely to choose out-group derogation over the activism strategy (43% vs. 57%) compared with participants in the low-identification condition (50% vs. 50%).

To provide an additional, more sensitive test of our primary hypotheses and examine separately the processes underlying each potential choice, we also conducted 2 (identification: low vs. high) \times 2 (violation: yes vs. no) ANOVAs separately for the two continuous measures: preference for the Muslim attitudes survey (opportunity for out-group derogation) and change U.S. policy survey (opportunity for activism). These tests allowed us to assess the effects of the identification and violation manipulations independently for the two contrasting strategies. The means for these measures are presented in Table 1.

For out-group derogation, the analysis revealed a main effect of violation condition, $F(1, 118) = 7.25$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .06$. Overall, participants in the violation condition reported a stronger preference for out-group derogation ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.77$) than those in the no-violation conditions ($M = 3.79$, $SD = 1.97$). The predicted interaction was also obtained, $F(1, 118) = 9.55$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$. As expected, when the in-group violated the belief, participants in the high-identification condition reported a stronger preference for the option permitting out-group derogation than participants in the low-identification condition, $F(1, 118) = 8.95$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .12$. However, when the in-group did not violate the

belief, there were no differences between the identification conditions ($F < 1$). Furthermore, a Tukey HSD procedure for pairwise comparisons revealed that the high-identification-violation condition was significantly different than the other three conditions on out-group derogation ($p = .03$). Pairwise comparisons revealed no difference between the other three conditions on out-group derogation.

With respect to the ratings of preference for the changing U.S. policy survey, which did not enhance social identity, there was only a significant main effect for identification condition, $F(1, 116) = 5.35$, $p < .03$, $\eta^2 = .02$. Participants in the low-identification condition reported a stronger preference for the behavior-change survey ($M = 4.82$, $SD = 1.83$) compared with those in the high-identification condition ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 1.83$).

Mediated moderation. We expected violation of personal beliefs by an in-group to produce dissonance-related discomfort, which in turn would motivate people to reduce this discomfort. Moreover, we hypothesized that preferences for the two strategies, out-group derogation and activism, would be moderated by manipulated level of in-group identification. Because there was no Identification \times Violation condition interaction for preference for the change U.S. policy survey, we did not examine mediated moderation for this survey. The Identification \times Violation interactions for psychological discomfort and preference for Muslim attitudes survey, reflecting an opportunity for identity-enhancing out-group derogation, were consistent with our expectations. Thus, we directly tested for mediated moderation with these measures.

The test of mediated moderation uses the interaction term (Violation \times Identification) as an independent variable, controlling for the two main effects (in our analysis, violation and identification; see Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). As revealed in our previous analyses, the first two requirements for mediated moderation were successfully met: (a) the Violation \times Identification interaction predicted preference for the Muslim survey, $\beta = .45$, $t(118) = 2.79$, $p < .01$, and (b) the Violation \times Identification interaction also predicted the mediator, psychological discomfort, $\beta = .44$, $t(118) = 3.10$, $p < .01$. In addition, supporting the hypothesized mediating role of psychological discomfort in this process, in the third step of the test, when both were considered simultaneously as predictors, psychological discomfort was significantly related to preference for the Muslim attitudes survey, $\beta = .29$, $t(117) = 3.03$, $p < .001$, while the direct effect of the Violation \times Identification interaction became nonsignificant, $\beta = .32$, $t(117) = 1.97$, $p = .06$. In addition, the bootstrapped estimate of the indirect effect was estimated to lie between 0.13 and 1.25 with

99% confidence. Because zero is not in the 99% confidence interval, the indirect effect is different from zero at the $p < .01$ level (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Thus, psychological discomfort explained the relation between identification condition and preference for the out-group derogation strategy.²

Discussion

Using a manipulation of identification, Experiment 2 provides additional, causal evidence that greater identification with the group is associated with intragroup dissonance strategies that enhance positive social identity. When given the choice between a social identity-enhancing intragroup dissonance reduction strategy (out-group derogation) and a less effective enhancing strategy (activism), participants in the high-identification condition were more likely to choose the strategy that allowed for positive distinctiveness (out-group derogation). Participants in the low-identification condition did not show a consistent preference. Mediation analyses demonstrated that the degree of preference for the strategy that provided an opportunity for social identity enhancement was motivated by the psychological discomfort associated with intragroup dissonance.

Experiment 2 also extends research investigating how individuals choose to reduce cognitive dissonance. Many studies investigating cognitive dissonance present one route to dissonance reduction, and these studies typically find that participants will use the first route presented or available (e.g., Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995). In one of the few studies examining choice of dissonance-reduction, Stone et al. (1997) found that when two strategies were available, participants chose the direct dissonance reduction strategy over the indirect strategy. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that for dissonance that stems from group-based processes, as well as threats that may come from intragroup processes, in-group identification may be a strong determinant of choice of strategy, with high identifiers preferring strategies that are better able to enhance social identity.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present results provide further evidence for the phenomenon of intragroup dissonance (Glasford et al., 2008) and illustrate how group identification influences not only the effectiveness but also the choice of intragroup dissonance reduction strategies. In Experiment 1, both self-affirmation and group affirmation were able to alleviate intragroup dissonance, but group affirmation, which enhances social identity (rather than personal identity), was particularly effective for high identifiers.

Moreover, in Experiment 2 in which level of in-group identification was manipulated, when group members became aware that an in-group violated a personal belief, high identifiers were more likely than were low identifiers to be drawn to a strategy that allowed for social identity enhancement (out-group derogation) over the strategy that was less effective at enhancing social identity (activism to change the behavior of the in-group).

Theoretically, our findings are consistent with the general tenets of social identity theory. Because those most identified with a group derive more of their self-concept from group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), strategies that reestablish the positive distinctiveness of the in-group should be more effective for relieving intragroup dissonance, as well as other types of identity conflicts, in those most connected to the group. The present research also demonstrates that under social contexts that threaten the in-group (Ellemers et al., 2002), high levels of in-group identification may sometimes be associated with reactions that can be detrimental to an out-group (e.g., out-group derogation) rather than responses that address the misdeeds of the in-group (e.g., activism). The general pattern of findings suggest that when high identifiers are made aware that an in-group has violated their personal beliefs, they are particularly interested in reestablishing positive distinctiveness, which can take the form of increased commitment (Ellemers et al., 1997), but may also have the consequence of producing a general orientation that leads to group-serving biases (e.g., memory; Sahdra & Ross, 2007) that are harmful for intergroup relations.

Our research on intragroup dissonance, which examines responses to contemporaneous transgressions by one's in-group that violate personal beliefs, complements research on collective guilt, wherein an in-group has historically transgressed against an out-group. Research on collective guilt has revealed that those more highly identified with the in-group are less likely to support reparations toward the harmed out-group (Doosje et al., 1998; cf. Roccas et al., 2006). The present results showed that psychological discomfort operates independently of collective guilt in such situations. Complementing work on collective guilt, our findings suggest that when the contemporary actions of an in-group violate personal beliefs, people more highly identified with the group are most responsive to interventions that emphasize the positive distinctiveness of the group. Thus, interventions that provide an opportunity for positive social identity enhancement, such as group affirmation, may be an important ingredient to programs designed to bring together combative groups (Cohen et al., 2007) but may also lay the foundation for those most connected to the group to address past or contemporaneous transgressions of the in-group.

Limitations and Future Directions

The present set of experiments not only provides new evidence of the role of in-group identification in the ways people respond to situations in which an in-group has violated their personal beliefs but also suggests promising directions for future research. The current experiments focused on identity-enhancing strategies for reducing one type of dissonance, intragroup dissonance. In both experiments, there was a strong relation between group identification and strategies that enhanced social identity. In Experiment 1, for example, group affirmation was more effective than self-affirmation for reducing dissonance among high in-group identifiers. This finding is consistent with previous research showing that high identifiers are more concerned with group goals than personal goals (Ellemers et al., 1997) and experience a greater number of benefits from group affirmation, relative to personal affirmation (Derks et al., 2007). Strategies that enhance social identity, such as group affirmation, may be particularly effective for intragroup dissonance because of the direct involvement of the in-group in initially arousing dissonance. Future research might therefore explore the efficacy of social identity-enhancing strategies for dealing with dissonance generated in other ways, such as from personal actions or disagreement within the group (Matz & Wood, 2005).

Another direction for additional work is to explore the relation between intragroup dissonance and collective guilt. The goal of the present research was to provide a test of the relation between group identification and social identity-enhancing intragroup dissonance reduction strategies. Because collective guilt was measured after the other affective states, the present work is not a critical test of the relation between intragroup dissonance and collective guilt. Clearly, however, more work is necessary to fully understand all of the factors that determine how group members resolve discrepancy between their personal beliefs and in-group behavior, as well as the relation between intragroup dissonance and collective guilt.

Finally, given the multifaceted nature of group identification (i.e., attachment vs. glorification; Roccas et al., 2006), and the fact that the present work focused on attachment, the present research also indicates that one avenue of investigation is to understand how the form of one's connection to the group, and particularly glorification, is related to intragroup dissonance. Those who are more likely to have a glorifying form of identification may not experience intragroup dissonance at all (see Roccas et al., 2006), or they may choose distinctly different intragroup dissonance reduction strategies. High identification in the form of glorification may also result in a particularly strong preference for social

identity-enhancing strategies over personal identity-enhancing strategies. Future research might therefore consider a broader range of dissonance reduction strategies that vary systematically on dimensions related to glorification of the in-group (e.g., intergroup comparisons reinforcing the superiority of the in-group) and attachment to the in-group (e.g., opportunity to be exposed to information that contradicts the moral incrimination of the group), as well as the opportunity to enhance social identity.

CONCLUSION

The present work demonstrates the role of in-group identification in resolving intragroup dissonance. High identifiers are not only better able to reduce intragroup dissonance with social identity-enhancing strategies but also are more likely to choose to reduce intragroup dissonance with strategies that enhance social identity. Understanding the processes associated with intragroup dissonance can provide important insights into the dynamics of intergroup relations and shed light on myriad processes that may lead people to allow unjust in-group behavior to continue, but may also reveal the conditions necessary for people to challenge such behavior.

NOTES

1. The effects of the affirmation manipulations were not related to the particular value chosen in both the self-affirmation (e.g., artistic skills) and group affirmation (e.g. freedom of speech) conditions.

2. To further explore the hypothesis that participants in the high-identification condition would have stronger motivations for out-group derogation than those in the low-identification condition, we performed a supplementary analysis of prejudice toward Muslims among participants who completed that particular second survey. These results should be interpreted cautiously because the participants chose, and were not randomly assigned to, the survey completion condition. Examining only those participants who chose the Muslim attitudes survey ($n = 61$; 5 others chose but did not complete the survey), a marginally significant Violation Condition \times Identification interaction, $F(1, 57) = 3.20, p = .07, \eta^2 = .05$, revealed that when the group violated the belief, participants in the high-identification condition reported greater anti-Muslim prejudice ($M = 3.31$) than did participants in the low-identification condition ($M = 2.20$), $F(1, 57) = 10.26, p = .04, \eta^2 = .28$. However, there were no differences between those in the high-identification ($M = 3.02$) and low-identification ($M = 2.90$) conditions in the no-violation condition ($F < 1$). For the participants who chose the change U.S. policy survey ($n = 61$), the analysis also revealed a significant Violation \times Identification interaction, $F(1, 57) = 12.38, p < .01, \eta^2 = .17$, showing the opposite pattern for willingness to engage in activism to change the behavior of the in-group. When the group violated the belief, participants in the low-identification condition ($M = 5.19$) reported greater intention to change the behavior of the group than did participants in the high-identification condition ($M = 3.42$), $F(1, 57) = 15.26, p = .01, \eta^2 = .28$. However, when the group did not violate the belief, there were no differences between conditions ($F < 1$).

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Received February 12, 2008

Revision accepted October 6, 2008